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Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior: Unintended
Consequences and Undesirable Results
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the maxim that natural disasters function as a great
equalizer, Hurricane Katrina has reminded us that “natural disasters
occur in the same social, historical, and political environment in
which disparities . . . already exist.” 1 The inequalities already present
in Hurricane Katrina’s path were given a fiercer breath of life,
disproportionately exacerbating the already dire circumstances of
New Orleans’ most vulnerable populations.
One such disparity became apparent when government officials
began ordering mandatory evacuations. After experiencing
Hurricane Georges in 1998 and Hurricane Ivan in 2004, emergency
planners responsible for evacuating New Orleans were already aware
of many of the risks facing vulnerable populations. 2 For example, the
“city already knew that at least ‘100,000 New Orleans Citizens [did]
not have means of personal transportation’ to evacuate in case of a
major storm.” 3 Notwithstanding this knowledge, the city’s
emergency plan had no solution for the evacuation problem and
instead “called for thousands of the city’s most vulnerable population
to be left behind.” 4 In fact, “little attention was paid [during disaster
1. Sandra Crouse Quinn, Hurricane Katrina: A Social and Public Health Disaster, 96
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 204, 204 (2006).
2. MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER,
AND RACE AFTER KATRINA 4 (2006).
3. Id. (quoting City of New Orleans, City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS (2005), http://www.cityofno.com); see also
Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2006)
(statement of Sen. Joe Lieberman) (“The warnings of the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise that
we have focused on in this Committee, that a hundred thousand people at least in New
Orleans had no means to evacuate and that thousands more would be immobilized by
infirmity or age, appear to have been received at all levels of government, but at all levels of
government just about nothing was done about those warnings.”).
4. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 2.
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planning meetings predating Katrina] to moving out New Orleans’
‘low-mobility’ population—the elderly, the infirm and the poor
without cars or other means of fleeing the city.” 5
A 2005 post-Katrina survey confirmed these inadequacies,
finding that, among respondents, forty-two percent of those who did
not evacuate had no way to leave. 6 Others reported that although
they could have left, other circumstances, such as vulnerable loved
ones, convinced them to stay behind. 7 Despite these realities, many
citizens and government officials blamed the victims for their
misfortunes. One study found that the public characterized nonevacuators as “passive (e.g., lazy, dependent), irresponsible (e.g.,
careless,
negligent),
and
inflexible
(e.g.,
stubborn,
8
uncompromising).” These results come as no surprise in light of the
government’s rhetoric concerning non-evacuation following the
disaster. Michael Brown, the Federal Emergency Agency Director at
the time, attributed the rising death toll in New Orleans to “people
who . . . chose not to leave.” 9 He explained, “[W]e’ve got to figure
out some way to convince people that whenever warnings go out it’s
for their own good.” 10 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland
Security, remarked, “[L]ocal and state officials called for a
mandatory evacuation. Some people chose not to obey that order.
That was a mistake on their part.” 11

5. Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Government Saw Flood Risk but Not Levee Failure, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/02/national/
nationalspecial/02response.html?hp&ex=1125633600&en=9ef3f7389573ef2a&ei=5094&par
tner=homepage&_r=0.
6. Mollyann Brodie et al., Experiences of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees in Houston
Shelters: Implications for Future Planning, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1402, 1404–05 (2006).
7. Id. at 1404.
8. Nicole M. Stephens et al., Why Did They “Choose” to Stay? Perspectives of Hurricane
Katrina Observers and Survivors, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 878, 880 (2009).
9. FEMA Chief: Victims Bear Some Responsibility, CNN.COM (Sept. 1, 2005, 11:41
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/WEATHER/09/01/katrina.fema.brown/.
10. Id.
11. American Morning: Interview with Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff
(CNN television broadcast Sept. 1, 2005) (quoted in Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The
Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 463
(2006)).
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The public’s perception of non-evacuators, combined with
comments from government officials, 12 reflects the policy judgments
many state legislatures have made and are beginning to make. Rick
Santorum’s remark 13 during a television interview is representative of
the direction that many states have taken: “[Y]ou have people who
don’t heed those warnings and then put people at risk as a result of
not heeding those warnings. There may be a need to look at tougher
penalties on those who decide to ride it out and understand that
there are consequences to not leaving.” 14 In the spirit of “tougher
penalties,” several states have passed statutes that criminalize nonevacuation, thereby subjecting violators of evacuation orders to
potential incarceration and financial penalties. In light of the
vulnerabilities common among non-evacuators, these criminalization
and sanctioning policies are impractical and unjust, regardless of
whether they are enforced. Further, many such statutes reflect an
erroneous judgment that non-evacuators are blameworthy for their
failure to comply.
Part I of this Comment will examine the developing body of law
aimed at curing the non-evacuation problem. In particular, this Part
will address two criminal frameworks that state legislatures have
employed to penalize non-evacuation: the traditional framework and
the public welfare offense doctrine. Part II will look at specific state
laws in an effort to categorize them within the traditional or public
welfare offense framework. Part III will examine different
enforcement regimes, namely arrest and relocation, prosecution, and
symbolic impact. Part IV will consider the impact of mens rea upon
those enforcement regimes, examine the class of offenders at risk
under each regime, and argue that criminalizing non-evacuation is
either ineffective in producing results or produces undesirable
results. Part V will conclude.

12. See, e.g., id.; FEMA Chief: Victims Bear Some Responsibility, supra note 9.
13. Santorum later said his remarks were only directed at those with resources to
evacuate. See Carrie Budoff, Candidates Sling Barbs over Hurricane Remark, PHILLY.COM
(Sept. 7, 2005), http://articles.philly.com/2005-09-07/news/25428468_1_jay-reiff-ricksantorum-john-brabender.
14. Id.
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I. THE STATE OF THE LAW CRIMINALIZING NON-EVACUATION

When a disaster occurs, state statutes typically grant the governor
authority to declare a state of emergency. 15 This declaration entitles
the governor to a new set of emergency powers, including the power
to issue evacuations. Statutes commonly grant the governor
authority to “direct and compel evacuation.” 16 Other statutes are
more explicit and specify that the governor’s orders made in
connection with the state of emergency have the “force and effect of
law.” 17 Regardless of the statutory language, the government’s power
to issue an evacuation that legally obligates residents to leave the
designated area has been established in a majority of states. 18
Although government officials have the power to order a
mandatory evacuation, states have struggled to find the best method
of enforcement. Some officials have expressed that mandatory
evacuation orders are only valuable insofar as they impress the
seriousness of danger upon the citizenry, while others have employed
their state’s plenary power to physically remove noncompliant
citizens. What is clear is that mandatory evacuation orders can serve
a variety of functions, both symbolic and practical. While states have
explored several approaches, including arresting and relocating
residents by use of “reasonable force,” 19 scare tactics,20

15. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-924(b)(1) (2005) (“The governor, upon finding
that a disaster has occurred or that occurrence or the threat thereof is imminent, shall issue a
proclamation declaring a state of disaster emergency.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.100(1)
(LexisNexis 2013) (“In the event of the occurrence or threatened or impending occurrence of
any of the situations or events contemplated by KRS 39A.010, 39A.020, or 39A.030, the
Governor may declare, in writing, that a state of emergency exists.”).
16. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-1-440(a)(7) (2013) (emphasis added).
17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:724(a) (Supp. 2014).
18. Brenner M. Fissell, Taxpayers as Victims: Taxpayer Harm & Criminalization, 7
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 126, 143 (2013) (“My own state survey finds twenty-eight states with
mandatory evacuation . . . .”).
19. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.185(b) (West 2012) (“A county judge or
mayor of a municipality who orders the evacuation of an area stricken or threatened by a
disaster by order may compel persons who remain in the evacuated area to leave and authorize
the use of reasonable force to remove persons from the area.”). Constitutional challenges have
been waged against statutes authorizing forcible removal, but the courts have upheld the
states’ authority. See Reynolds v. New Orleans, 272 F. App’x 331 (5th Cir. 2008).
Furthermore, this authority may have some strings attached. See Konie v. Louisiana, CIV. No.
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criminalization, 21 and civil liability for rescue, 22 this Comment will
focus on criminalization.
A. Criminalization: Traditional Framework and Public Welfare Offense

This Comment will discuss two theories governing conviction of
non-evacuators: the traditional framework and public welfare
offense doctrine.
1. Traditional framework: actus reus and mens rea

To fully assess an individual’s culpability for a criminal act,
society traditionally “demands that an individual both make a wrong
choice and commit a wrongful act.” 23 In other words, society
requires both an actus reus and mens rea. Actus reus, or the
“comprehensive notion of act, harm, and its connecting link [of]
causation,” 24 is typically satisfied when one commits a voluntary act
that in turn causes the proscribed harm. As one scholar put it, “actus
express[es] the voluntary physical movement in the sense of conduct
and reus express[es] the fact that this conduct results in a certain
proscribed harm.” 25
Mens rea, on the other hand, requires that the actor have a
criminal intent. While diverse language has been used to classify the
varying levels of intent, the Model Penal Code has established four

05-6310, 2010 WL 812980 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2010), for an example of how law
enforcement was exposed to potential liability while enforcing mandatory evacuation orders in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Forcible removal, to some extent, merges with criminalization.
However, they will be treated separately for the purposes of this paper.
20. Amy L. Fairchild, James Colgrove & Marian Moser Jones, The Challenge of
Mandatory Evacuation: Providing For and Deciding For, 25 HEALTH AFF. 958, 963 (2006)
(“Local police have often asked those who refuse to evacuate for contact information for next
of kin to impress on them the gravity of the risk they were assuming.”).
21. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-317(2) (West 2014).
22. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.185(d) (West 2014).
23. Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of “Willful” and the
Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 397, 410 (1995).
24. Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative
Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 386 (1965).
25. Id.

507

CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/23/2015 3:53 PM

2015

broad and representative categories: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence. Each category represents a
“progressively less directed and intentional form of conduct.” 26
While purpose denotes “the intent to purposefully do an act,
knowing that it is an unlawful act,” 27 knowledge denotes the intent to
do an act without knowledge of its unlawfulness. 28 While recklessness
denotes “gross disregard for a risk created by an actor’s conduct,” 29
negligence indicates that an actor failed to account for a risk he
should have. 30
In the traditional framework, whether discussing actus reus or
mens rea, choice is a primary consideration. In essence, “[i]n the
absence of a wrong choice, the moral justification for refusing to
respect a person’s liberty disappears.” 31 Criminal excuses illustrate the
impact choice can have on criminal liability. William Blackstone
emphasized this principle when he said, “All the several pleas and
excuses, which protect the committer[s] of a forbidden act from the
punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced to
this single consideration, the want or defect of will.” 32 What would
otherwise be a convictable act is guarded from conviction when the
actor’s conduct is not the product of choice. Put another way, one
escapes liability when his outward act is beyond his control, such as a
reflex, convulsion, or unconscious movement. 33 Other defenses, such
as self-defense, shield an actor from liability because the actor’s
options are greatly limited, not because the actor has been deprived
of choice. The Model Penal Code commentators explained this
rationale: “[L]aw is ineffective . . . if it imposes on the actor who has
the misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that his
judges are not prepared to affirm that they should and could comply

26. Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct,
CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 28, 32.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Simonoff, supra note 23.
32. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20, *20.
33. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962).
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with if their turn to face the problem should arise.” 34 To some
extent, the law’s effectiveness under the traditional framework
depends on whether its standards account for the complexity of
choice in an imperfect world.
2. Public welfare offenses

Public welfare offenses turn the traditional framework on its
head. Rather than punishing an individual for a wrongful choice,
public welfare offenses seek to punish offenders who commit a
prohibited act. These offenses began to develop in the early
twentieth century and were meaningfully explicated in a seminal
1933 article by Francis Bowes Sayre. 35 He argued that public welfare
offenses reflect a judgment that social order often outweighs the
importance of individual liberty, carry light penalties, and involve
conduct for which evidence of the offender’s state of mind is
particularly difficult to prove. 36 The difficulty of proving state of
mind arises especially where the circumstances “necessitate
enforcement against such armies of offenders that to require proof of
each individual’s intent would be virtually to prevent adequate
enforcement.” 37 The primary practical difference between the
traditional framework and the public welfare offense doctrine is that
the latter does not require proof of criminal intent. 38 Such offenses

34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 (“Proper Scope of Defense”).
35. Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55–56 (1933).
36. Id. at 72.
37. Id.
38. With this definition, public welfare offenses begin to sound like strict liability
offenses. The Supreme Court has noted, however, that public welfare offenses are not
necessarily “[t]rue strict liability” offenses. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3
(1994) (“[W]e have avoided construing criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict
liability. . . . True strict liability might suggest that the defendant need not know even that he
was dealing with a dangerous item. Nevertheless, we have referred to public welfare offenses as
‘dispensing with’ or ‘eliminating’ a mens rea requirement or ‘mental element[.]’ . . . While use
of the term ‘strict liability’ is really a misnomer, we have interpreted statutes defining public
welfare offenses to eliminate the requirement of mens rea; that is, the requirement of a ‘guilty
mind’ with respect to an element of a crime. Under such statutes we have not required that the
defendant know the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense. Generally
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criminalize the act itself without concern for whether the actor
intentionally broke the law. 39
The question of whether a particular law operates under the
traditional framework or the public welfare framework has, at times,
been difficult for courts to resolve. The public welfare offense is
commonly found in the void of legislative silence. Defining the
criminal law is largely the province of states, but the Supreme Court
has also provided guidance, especially when a law presents due
process concerns. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
laid out a test for this question, 40 it has examined the public welfare
doctrine and suggested several factors to consider. 41 In Morissette v.
United States, for example, the Court undertook an extensive
analysis of the public welfare offense’s evolution and character. 42 The
dispute arose when Morissette, a local fruit stand operator, trucker,
and scrap iron collector, removed and converted used bomb casings
from government-owned property. 43 Although Morissette claimed to
be operating under the belief that the casings had been abandoned,
the government indicted and charged him with “‘unlawfully, wilfully
and knowingly steal[ing] and convert[ing]’” U.S. government
property. 44 The trial court rejected Morissette’s defense outright and
barred his attorney from introducing it altogether. 45 Instead, it found
that Morissette’s act spoke for itself: “‘The question on intent is
whether or not he intended to take the property. He says he did.
Therefore, . . . he is guilty . . . . [Felonious intent] is presumed by his

speaking, such knowledge is necessary to establish mens rea, as is reflected in the maxim
ignorantia facti excusat.”).
39. See Simonoff, supra note 23, at 409.
40. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (“Neither this Court nor,
so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set forth
comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and
crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is neither
settled nor static.”).
41. See, e.g., id. at 254–63; Staples, 511 U.S. at 604–20.
42. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250–63.
43. Id. at 247–48.
44. Id. at 248 (quoting language from the indictment).
45. Id. at 249.
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own act.’” 46 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding
that the statute did not require criminal intent, an assumption the
court gleaned from Congress’s failure to “express such a requisite” 47
and Supreme Court precedent. 48
In analyzing the lower courts’ decisions, the Supreme Court
reviewed the development of the public welfare offense, contrasting
that development against the historical, “universal and persistent” 49
presumption of a criminal intent requirement. 50 Through this review,
the Court outlined several characteristics of public welfare offenses:
(1) they often punish acts of “neglect where the law requires care”; 51
(2) they are regulatory in nature, not originating in common law; 52
(3) they often “result in no direct or immediate injury to person or
property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the
law seeks to minimize”; 53 (4) they offend the state’s authority by
impairing its ability to efficiently maintain social order; 54 (5) the
injury is the same regardless of intent; 55 (6) penalties are often

46. Id.
47. Id. at 249–250.
48. Id. at 250. The precedents the court of appeals relied on were United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), and United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). Morissette,
342 U.S. at 250. Of the rulings in these cases, the Supreme Court stated:
In those cases this Court did construe mere omission from a criminal enactment of
any mention of criminal intent as dispensing with it. If they be deemed precedents
for principles of construction generally applicable to federal penal statutes, they
authorize this conviction. Indeed, such adoption of the literal reasoning announced
in those cases would do this and more—it would sweep out of all federal crimes,
except when expressly preserved, the ancient requirement of a culpable state of
mind. We think a résumé of their historical background is convincing that an effect
has been ascribed to them more comprehensive than was contemplated and one
inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law.
Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 250–51.
Id. at 250–63.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
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relatively small; 56 and (7) conviction does not gravely impair an
offender’s reputation. 57 Taking these factors into consideration, the
Court held that the mere omission of intent from the statute did not
justify eliminating the mens rea requirement, especially in light of
larceny’s common law origins. 58
The Supreme Court had another opportunity to set firm criteria
for evaluating the public welfare offense in Staples v. United States;
however, the Court ultimately relied on the logic set forth in
Morissette and refused to elaborate any definitive test. 59 Despite this
denial to further define the contours of the doctrine, many state
courts have construed the Staples Court’s language into a multifactor test. 60 The Staples factors these courts have identified largely
overlap with the Morissette factors. Those that do not explicitly
overlap are fairly intuitive and include “the extent to which a strictliability reading of the statute would encompass innocent conduct;”

56. Id.
57. Id. Others have distilled the factors defining public welfare offenses similarly. See,
e.g., Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960) (“From these cases
emerges the proposition that where a federal criminal statute omits mention of intent and
where it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is,
under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person,
where the penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the
statutory crime is not one taken over from the common law, and where congressional purpose
is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent.”); David P.
Gold, Wildlife Protection and Public Welfare Doctrine, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 633, 640
(2002) (“First, the crime is always a violation of a modern regulatory statute with little or no
common law history. Second, the activity regulated by the statute is of such a nature that those
engaging in it can reasonably be expected to take the precautions necessary to avoid violations.
Third, conviction brings only minor penalties and little damage to the perpetrator’s reputation.
Fourth, the statute would be unusually hard to enforce if specific intent were required.”).
58. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263–73.
59. 511 U.S. 600, 619–20 (1994).
60. See, e.g., State v. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (listing the
Staples factors as “(1) the background rules of the common law and its conventional mens rea
requirement; (2) whether the crime can be characterized as a public welfare offense; (3) the
extent to which a strict-liability reading of the statute would encompass innocent conduct; (4)
the harshness of the penalty; (5) the seriousness of the harm to the public; (6) the ease or
difficulty of the defendant ascertaining the true facts; (7) relieving the prosecution of timeconsuming and difficult proof of fault; and (8) the number of prosecutions expected”).

512

CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

503

11/23/2015 3:53 PM

Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior

“relieving the prosecution of time-consuming and difficult proof of
fault;” and “the number of prosecutions expected.” 61
While the traditional framework can largely be said to criminalize
choice, the public welfare offense doctrine sanctions conduct,
regardless of whether the conduct is the product of choice. The
notion driving this policy is that preventing such conduct is so
crucial to the public welfare that its value exceeds that of individual
liberty. By enacting public welfare offenses, legislatures express a
willingness to risk punishing non-culpable parties if, by doing so,
they can decrease commission of the conduct. 62
II. STATE STATUTES CRIMINALIZING NON-EVACUATION

Having outlined the characteristics of the traditional framework
and public welfare offense doctrine, I now consider which framework
statutes criminalizing non-evacuation behavior have adopted. While
several states have enacted such statutes, 63 there appears to be
disagreement over the appropriate mens rea requirement. In this
section, I will begin by discussing several state laws that have
adopted the traditional framework, although with varying
requirements of criminal intent. I will then analyze North Carolina’s
law to determine whether it falls within the public welfare offense
doctrine. North Carolina’s law deserves special attention because it
appears to be an outlier as the only public welfare offense and may
serve as a model if the criminalization of non-evacuation movement
continues to gain traction.

61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 422 n.108 (1993).
63. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.405(3) (West 1981) (“A person who willfully
disobeys or interferes with the implementation of a rule, order, or directive issued by the
governor pursuant to this section is guilty of a misdemeanor”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A19.31(h) (West 2013) (“Any person who violates any provision of an ordinance or a
declaration enacted or declared pursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class 2
misdemeanor in accordance with G.S. 14-288.20A.”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(5) (McKinney
2010) (“Any person who knowingly violates any local emergency order of a chief executive
promulgated pursuant to this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.”).
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A. States Applying the Traditional Framework

Several states have adopted the traditional framework to address
the non-evacuation problem. For example, Utah’s law states that
“[a] person may not refuse to comply with an order to evacuate . . .
or refuse to comply with any other order issued by the governor in a
state of an emergency . . . if notice of the order has been given to
that person.” 64 A person who violates an evacuation order “is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor.” 65 The fact that the statute prohibits
“refus[al]” and requires the violator to receive notice of the order 66
suggests that innocent and ignorant non-compliance is not
punishable. At least some degree of mens rea must be established,
placing Utah’s statute within the traditional framework.
Furthermore, even absent a notice requirement, a general provision
in Utah’s criminal code states that when the crime’s definition does
not express a clear intent to impose strict liability, and “the definition
of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state . . . intent,
knowledge or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal
responsibility.” 67 Accordingly, the Utah statute clearly falls within the
traditional framework. 68
Other states designate a more explicit level of culpability. For
example, Michigan’s law states that a person must “willfully
disobey[] or interfere[].” 69 The plain meaning of willful may imply
nothing more than intention, meaning the actor intended to act, but
not to break the law. 70 However, Michigan courts have suggested a

64. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-317(1) (West 2014).
65. Id. § 76-8-317(2).
66. Id. § 76-8-317(1).
67. Due S., Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 197 P.3d 82, 94 (Utah 2008)
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2012)).
68. Also noteworthy is Utah Senator Mark B. Madsen’s recent proposal to amend this
section to remove criminal liability. The amendment advocates allowing persons to stay in their
home, but includes an explicit caveat that those who remain may not receive rescue aid timely
or at all. See S.B. 273, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013).
69. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.405(3) (West 2014).
70. See Pavlov v. Cmty. Emergency Med. Serv., Inc., 491 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (citing McKimmy v. Conductors Protective Assurance Co., 235 N.W. 242, 242
(1931)); see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 130 (2008).
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higher standard associated with willfulness, requiring that the act be
committed with “design and purpose.” 71 The statute appears to be
aimed at punishing choice, again falling within the traditional
framework. New York, rather than requiring a willful violation,
requires that the actor “knowingly” act. 72 In People v. Shapiro, the
New York Court of Appeals explained that “[t]he term ‘knowingly’
imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the act or
omission a crime, and does not require knowledge of the
unlawfulness of the act or omission.” 73 Thus, New York’s law appears
to require a mens rea similar to Utah’s in that both require notice or
knowledge of the evacuation order, but not knowledge of the
unlawfulness of non-compliance.
B. North Carolina’s Public Welfare Offense

North Carolina’s non-evacuation statute 74 departs substantially
from other state statutes in that it appears to be a public welfare
offense, requiring no mens rea. State v. Watterson 75 provides a
roadmap for how North Carolina courts evaluate whether a state
statute creates a public welfare offense. In that case, the court
considered whether a statute, which made it “unlawful for any
person to manufacture, assemble, possess, store, transport, sell, offer
to sell, purchase, offer to purchase, deliver or give to another, or
acquire any weapon of mass death and destruction[,]” created a
public welfare offense. 76 First, the court considered statutory
language, asking whether, as a matter of construction, the language
created a public welfare offense, taking into account its manifest
purpose and design. 77 Second, the court considered eight factors

71. Montgomery v. Muskegon Booming Co., 50 N.W. 729, 731 (Mich. 1891).
72. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(5) (McKinney 2014).
73. People v. Shapiro, 152 N.E.2d 65, 67 (N.Y. 1958).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.30(d), (h) (2013) (criminalizing non-compliance with
evacuation orders).
75. State v. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
76. Id. at 899 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.8(a) (2013)).
77. Id. at 900.
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discussed in Staples v. United States. 78 The court approached this
second multi-factor inquiry with hesitation, noting that Staples
involved a case of federal statutory interpretation, while the task
presently before the court was to interpret a state statute. 79
Accordingly, the second inquiry was undertaken as a belt-andsuspenders measure and does not appear to be a dispositive or
necessary step. As discussed, these Staples factors largely resemble the
Morissette factors. 80 To fully consider the Morissette factors, while
staying true to the Watterson analysis, I will consider both the
Morissette factors, as well as the Staples factors insofar as they are not
already covered in the Morissette analysis. To determine whether
North Carolina’s non-evacuation statute creates a public welfare
offense, this Section will first consider the statutory language, and
then the substantive factors laid out in Morissette and Staples.
1. The statutory language and context

The North Carolina non-evacuation statute reads, in part, that
“[a]ny person who violates any provision of a declaration or executive
order issued pursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class 2
misdemeanor in accordance with G.S. 14-288.20A.” 81 Notably, the
legislature has omitted any reference to mens rea. The abovereferenced section, G.S. 14-288.20A, also neglects to reference mens
rea for this violation. It lays out three crimes as follows:
Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class 2
misdemeanor:
(1) Violates any provision of an ordinance or a declaration enacted
or declared pursuant to G.S. 166A-19.31.
(2) Violates any provision of a declaration or executive order issued
pursuant to G.S. 166A-19.30.

78.
79.
80.
81.
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Id. at 901 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604–19 (1994).
Id. at 902 (citing State v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 601, 605 (Ohio 2000)).
See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.30(d) (2013).
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(3) Willfully refuses to leave the building as directed in a
Governor’s order issued pursuant to G.S. 166A-19.78. 82

The first and second subsections refer to violating evacuation
orders issued by municipalities and governors, respectively. 83 These
orders involve evacuation from a stricken or threatened area. 84 The
third section, however, deals with the violation of a governor’s order
to evacuate a building. While the first two subsections dealing with
evacuations from stricken or threatened areas omit any mens rea
requirement, the third subsection requires the actor to “willfully
refuse[].” This contrast suggests that the legislature had culpability
language within its vernacular, and that it made an explicit choice to
not require culpability in the event of evacuating from a threatened
or stricken area. This assumption is particularly appropriate in light
of the fact that the supreme court of North Carolina has inferred a
legislative intent to create a public welfare offense from similar
statutory omissions. 85 Furthermore, the Watterson court noted that
“‘[w]hen a legislative body includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that [the legislative body] acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” 86
2. The Morissette and Staples factors

The factors identified in Morissette and Staples also lend support
to the proposition that North Carolina’s legislature intended to
create a public welfare offense. This Section will consider (1) the

82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.20A (2013).
83. See id. §§ 166A-19.30(b)(1), -19.31(b)(1).
84. Id.
85. See Watson Seafood & Poultry Co., Inc. v. George W. Thomas, Inc., 220 S.E.2d
536, 542 (N.C. 1975) (noting that the driving regulation was “a safety statute enacted by the
Legislature for the public’s common safety and welfare. The statute does not contain the
words ‘knowingly,’ ‘willfully’ or any other words of like import. It was the obvious intent of
the Legislature to make the performance of a specific act a criminal violation and to thereby
place upon the individual the burden to know whether his conduct is within the
statutory prohibition.”).
86. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 900 (quoting N. C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Hudson, 675
S.E.2d 709, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Morissette factors, and (2) the non-duplicative Staples factors. The
examination that follows is not intended to demonstrate that North
Carolina’s statute should be a public welfare offense; rather, it is
meant to discern whether it is reasonable to impute this intent
upon the legislature in light of the characteristics the Supreme
Court has identified.
The first factor, whether the law seeks to punish neglect when
care is required, supports this proposition. Non-evacuation, at least
from a legal perspective, is the failure to act when the law requires
action. Although the statute speaks in terms of the government
official’s duty to direct and compel evacuation, the sanctioning
power backing that order implies and imposes the duty upon those
within the specified areas. 87
Secondly, Morissette emphasized that public welfare offenses tend
to not have common law roots. 88 Emergency powers are not the type
of powers thought to originate in the common law. Such powers,
especially the power to order evacuation of geographic regions, have
developed to improve public safety as cities’ populations have
increased. As Morrissette points out in its discussion of public welfare
offenses, the “[c]ongestion of cities and crowding of quarters called
for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times.” 89
Additionally, the Watterson court explained that the statutory article
containing the weapons of mass destruction statute contained laws of
a regulatory, rather than common law, nature. 90 Significant for our
purposes, the weapons of mass destruction statute at issue was and
continues to be codified in the same article, Article 36A, as § 14288.20A, the statute criminalizing non-evacuation. 91 As support for
this proposition, the court referenced a general provision, Section
14-288.3 of the North Carolina Code, which applied to all sections
of Article 36A (including the non-evacuation section). 14-288.3

87. See § 166A-19.30.
88. See supra text accompanying note 52.
89. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952).
90. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 902.
91. Thus, both Sections 14-288.8 and 14-288.20A of the North Carolina Code are
contained in Article 36A, entitled “Riots, Civil Disorders, and Emergencies.” N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-288.8, 14-288.20A (2013).
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states that offenses within the Article are “intended to ‘supersede
and extend the coverage’ of the common law.” 92 The provision also
states the Article is “intended to be supplementary and additional to
the common law . . . .” 93 Both the legislature and the court appear to
regard offenses within Article 36A as reaching beyond the common
law, and the court explicitly extends this rationale to justify finding a
legislative intent to abrogate the common law presumption in favor
of mens rea. 94
The third Morissette consideration, whether the act is designed to
decrease the probability of danger or injury to person or property, 95
also favors labeling the law a public welfare offense. The idea of
probability is often fundamental to an evacuation order. Whether or
not the threat necessitating the evacuation will strike is often
questionable, and whether those violating an evacuation order will
suffer damage to property or person is also uncertain. This is evident
from North Carolina’s statutory definition of “disaster declaration,”
which provides that such a declaration is issued when the “the impact
or anticipated impact of an emergency constitutes a disaster . . . .” 96
The fourth characteristic, that the regulated conduct offends
state authority, 97 also favors deeming the law a public welfare offense.
This requires ascertaining the nature of the state’s authority and how
non-evacuation offends that authority. First, North Carolina’s
supreme court has succinctly explained the state’s relevant authority:
“[T]he police power of the State may be exercised to enact laws,
within constitutional limits, ‘to protect or promote the health,
morals, order, safety, and general welfare of society.’” 98 With this
92. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 902 (citing § 14-288.3).
93. § 14-288.3.
94. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d at 902.
95. See supra text accompanying note 53. This factor overlaps with the Staples factor
requiring consideration of the ease or difficulty of the defendant ascertaining the true facts.
Both involve the uncertain circumstances involved in evacuation.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.3(3) (2013) (emphasis added).
97. See supra text accompanying note 54. This factor essentially requires the same
analysis as the Staples factor asking whether the crime can be characterized as a public
welfare offense.
98. Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (N.C. 2008) (quoting State v.
Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (N.C. 1949)).
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power in mind, it is clear that non-evacuators could conceivably
offend the state’s power to protect order, safety, and general welfare.
For example, non-evacuators could impede the egress process,
endangering themselves and others, or increase taxpayer burdens in
the event of rescue.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh Morissette characteristics also favor
labeling the law a public welfare offense. 99 The fifth factor, that
harm is the same regardless of intent, is invariably true in the context
of non-evacuation. 100 Generally speaking, the threatening or
damaging forces involved in emergency situations do not take the
intent of a non-evacuator into account. Furthermore, rescue workers
and taxpayers stand to suffer the same harm whether the individual
willfully stays or is helplessly trapped, and this is the harm that
proponents of the law primarily identify. 101 The sixth factor, that
penalties are often relatively small is also true in this case—the
penalty for non-compliance is a Class 2 misdemeanor. 102 The seventh
characteristic, that conviction does not gravely impair an offender’s
reputation, is also true of North Carolina’s law, at least insofar as it is
a regulatory crime not associated with behavior traditionally
perceived as immoral.
The first non-duplicative Staples factor, “the extent to which a
strict-liability reading of the statute would encompass innocent
103
conduct,” is complicated in the non-evacuation context.
The
Watterson court gleaned this factor from language in Staples, which
asked whether an illegally possessed item was sufficiently dangerous
to put its owner on notice of the likelihood of regulation. 104 By
analogy, this factor may consider whether the geographical,

99. See supra text accompanying notes 55–57.
100. This factor overlaps with the Staples factor that considers the seriousness of the harm
to the public.
101. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
102. A class 2 misdemeanor in North Carolina imposes a maximum prison sentence of 6
months and a maximum fine of $1,000. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–3(a)(2)(2014); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A–1340.23(2) (2014).
103. State v. Watterson, 679 S.E.2d 897, 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604–19 (1994)).
104. Id. at 902–03.
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meteorological, and social indicia of danger are likely to be
sufficient to put the actor on notice of the likelihood of an
evacuation order. Basically, the inquiry is whether a person, in the
absence of actual knowledge of the evacuation order, should know
from other alarming conditions that an evacuation order has been
issued. This question is complicated because the prohibited
conduct is behavior that citizens lawfully engage in on a daily
basis—remaining in their home. But it is possible that general
knowledge about threats inherent in an area’s geography (i.e., the
presence of fault lines or low-lying land in a hurricane-prone area),
combined with other warning signs, such as gloomy skies or
packing neighbors, sufficiently puts residents on notice that an
official has ordered evacuation.
The second and third non-duplicative Staples factors weigh in
105
favor of the public welfare offense classification. First, the statute
relieves the prosecution of time-consuming and difficult proof of
fault. Evidence is likely to be difficult to come by in the messy
aftermath of a disaster, and the decision to not evacuate is
particularly complicated. Offenders may blame late evacuation
notices or insufficient state assistance. The public welfare framework
would relieve the prosecutor of having to navigate through this series
of scapegoating attempts. 106 Second, assuming a prosecutor ever used
the statute to penalize a non-evacuator, a vast number of offenders
would fall within the statute’s reach. 107 That no such prosecutions
have been uncovered does not prove that the law will never be used
in this way, especially since these laws are in their infancy.
Having examined the legislature’s intent from a textual perspective
and the Morissette and Staples factors, North Carolina’s evacuation

105. Id. at 901 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 604–19).
106. This is not to say that such “scapegoating attempts” could not amount to valid
defenses. This is true regardless of whether the statute requires a mens rea element.
107. I have not found any cases involving criminal prosecution pursuant to a nonevacuation statute. On WestlawNext, I searched all state and federal court databases with the
following queries: “(emergency OR disaster) & ((evacuat! /s crim!)),” “(emergency OR
disaster) & ((evacuat! /p crim!)),” and “(evacuat! /s crim!).” Similar efforts on popular search
engines yielded similar results.
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statute appears to create a public welfare offense, imposing criminal
liability on non-evacuators without a mens rea requirement.
C. Competing Interests

A survey of the state statutes criminalizing non-evacuation
demonstrates that legislatures around the country have made a wide
range of differing policy judgments, stretching from willful, to
knowing, to strict liability.
At their core, the disparate mens rea requirements are the
product of a calculus balancing individual liberty against public
safety. When the mens rea standard is heightened, the legislature
appears to be prioritizing individual liberty over public safety.
Contrarily, when the mens rea standard is low or non-existent, the
legislature appears to make the opposite judgment—that public
safety, when compared to individual liberty, is a value more worthy
of protection.
III. THE INTERACTION OF ENFORCEMENT AND MENS REA

The mens rea requirement affects how the law is enforced and
whom it is enforced against. High mens rea requirements make the
law more difficult to enforce and limit the kind of offender the law
can reach. 108 Because disasters and their accompanying evacuation
orders typically affect a large group of people, the mens rea
requirement is an important feature with serious potential to limit or
expand the scope of enforcement and offenders. The evacuation
order will apply to those who are wealthy and poor, prepared and
unprepared, sick and healthy; some are entirely capable of coping
with disasters and the evacuations that may accompany them, while
others are helpless. In light of this interaction between mens rea and
enforcement, this Part will address two questions: First, how are
these laws enforced? Second, how do the disparate mens rea
requirements impact that enforcement?

108. See generally Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV.
415, 420–23 (2007).
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A. Enforcement and Mens Rea

Statutes criminalizing non-evacuation exist to serve one or more
of the following purposes: justify the arrest and relocation of citizens,
serve as grounds for prosecution, or operate as a symbolic expression
of social norms. The purpose of this discussion is not only to explore
the various ways the law can be enforced, but also to ascertain how
the disparate mens rea requirements will affect the efficacy of these
enforcement goals.
1. Arrest and relocation

To perform an arrest, an officer must have probable cause to
believe that an individual has committed a crime. 109 “If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” 110 Because
law enforcement is empowered to inform citizens of evacuation
orders, mens rea is not likely to have an impact on the officer’s
assessment of probable cause, even when the statute requires a willful
violation. Essentially, the non-evacuator’s conduct becomes willful as
soon as law enforcement informs him of his obligation to leave. 111
Accordingly, the mens rea requirement does not significantly affect
the arrest and relocation objective.
2. Criminal prosecution

On the other hand, with respect to criminal indictment, the
mens rea threshold has a significant impact on which offenders the
statute will reach. Generally, mens rea is the most difficult element of
a crime to prove—the higher the culpability, the more difficult it is

109. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
110. Id. at 354.
111. See, e.g., Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
“[p]olice have a hard time evaluating competing claims about motive; they are entitled to act
on the basis of observable events and let courts resolve conflicts about mental states”).
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to prove. 112 States employing a willful standard impose a significant
burden on prosecutors and increase the amount of resources
required to secure conviction. The willful standard also safeguards
liberty in that it requires the prosecutor to demonstrate that the
unlawful act was the product of choice. Conversely, with respect to
the public welfare offense, the prosecutor’s burden becomes
relatively low. Just as a willful standard safeguards liberty, a public
welfare offense loosens its protection of liberty in the interest of
regulating and, presumably, protecting the public.
3. Symbolic impact

States may have no intention of enforcing statutes criminalizing
non-evacuation. At the time of this writing, my survey has not
uncovered any such prosecutions. 113 Instead, these statutes may serve
a symbolic purpose, solely intended to communicate social norms.
The expressive theory of criminal law explains this symbolic impact.
The expressive theory states that the law communicates social values,
placing legislatures and courts in the position of shaping, defining,
codifying, and/or disseminating norms. 114 As the law becomes linked
with norms, the cost of criminal conduct is not only punishment for
law breaking, but also social condemnation for norm breaking. 115
The expressive function of law does not depend on enforcement, at
least not in the sense that a violator must be sanctioned pursuant to a
statute. 116 Rather, law’s expressive function can operate independent
of nominal enforcement, finding its power through the spontaneous
processes of social perception, pressure, and condemnation.

112. Alun Griffiths, People v. Ryan: A Trap for the Unwary, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1011,
1014 (1995) (“Because a defendant’s mental state can be difficult to prove, a mens rea
requirement places significant administrative and labor burdens on prosecutors and the judicial
system.”).
113. See supra note 107.
114. See Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive
Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 419, 423-29 (2011).
115. Id. at 420-21.
116. See, e.g., id. at 456-58 (finding “secondary [seatbelt] laws, despite having zero
penalty for otherwise obedient drivers, have a large and significant impact on behavior”).
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Furthermore, the law’s expressive power does not depend on a
malum in se categorization. Traditionally, malum in se crimes attract
the indignation of society because, in theory, they sanction conduct
that is inherently repugnant. However, the expressive function
demonstrates that even malum prohibitum crimes can attract
condemnation. This is presumably because such crimes are enacted
to serve public safety interests, and violators, by their unlawful
conduct, exhibit a carelessness or indifference for others’ welfare that
is socially reprehensible.
It seems unlikely that mens rea requirements have any impact
on the law’s symbolic value because symbolic value depends on
the public’s perception of the law. Research suggests that an
actor’s intent does not dictate the public’s perception of a crime’s
seriousness; instead, whether the public views a crime as serious
depends on the results of the action. 117 For example, the Model
Penal Code punishes attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy in the
same way it punishes the completed offense. 118 This is so because
the intent of the actor is the same regardless of whether the result
is accomplished. In contrast, the public does not believe that
inchoate offenses are worthy of serious sanctions. 119 Whereas the
Model Penal Code punishes an actor’s intent, the public looks at
the results of the conduct to evaluate the level of desert and the
appropriateness of a serious sanction. 120 While there are certainly
exceptions to this rule, generally speaking, society cares more
about harmful results than intent.
IV. WHO ARE THE OFFENDERS?

Having identified the impact mens rea has upon various
enforcement regimes, this Section considers who will be

117. Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 56 (1997).
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16
CRIME & JUST. 136 (1992)).
120. Id.
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implicated under each enforcement regime. Whether the law will
affect a given individual depends on several factors. To fully
explore the implications of enforcement, three matters require
examination. In section A, I will identify a potential class of
offenders. In section B, I will identify who, among this class of
offenders, would fall within the statutes under each enforcement
regime described above, namely, arrest and relocation,
prosecution, and symbolic function. Ultimately, I will
demonstrate that the statutes create undesirable results.
A. Who Are the Non-Evacuators, and Why Don’t They Evacuate?

Several studies have sought to assess evacuation behavior,
especially among those who remain behind. 121 To paint a portrait of
these individuals, researchers have tried to understand the factors
affecting their decisions. Non-evacuators often consider factors such
as the magnitude and proximity of the disaster, past encounters with
disasters, vulnerability of dependents, and consistency and clarity of
warnings. 122 Other studies have taken a more nuanced approach,
focusing on the impact social factors have on non-evacuation
behavior. Such studies have helped bring to the forefront an
unfortunate truth: for minority and impoverished communities, the
choice not to evacuate is often not a choice at all. As far as criminal
law is concerned, the nuanced justifications of non-evacuation do
not affect liability unless they rise to the level of a viable defense.
This occurs when justifications inhibit the agency of an actor so
severely as to remove the element of choice from the equation
altogether. For purposes of analyzing criminal liability, I will consider
two classes of non-evacuators: First, there are those who choose not
to evacuate, despite having a meaningful opportunity to do so
(“Willful Stayers”). Second, there are those whose agency is
121. See, e.g., Earl J. Baker, Hurricane Evacuation Behavior, 9 INT’L J. MASS
EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 287 (1991); Robert Bolin, Evacuation Behavior and Problems:
Findings and Implications from the Research Literature, 2 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES &
DISASTERS 419 (1984); Keith Elder et al., African Americans’ Decisions Not to Evacuate New
Orleans Before Hurricane Katrina: A Qualitative Study, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S124 (2007);
Stephens, supra note 8.
122. See Elder, supra note 121, at S124.
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inhibited to an extent that evacuation is impractical or impossible
(“Vulnerable Stayers”). 123
It is unclear whether Willful Stayers account for a large portion
of non-evacuators. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, official reports
suggest that those who had the resources to leave largely did so. 124
But reports and responses from public officials, 125 news media, 126 and
the public generally 127 suggest that willful non-evacuation in the
wake of a disaster is a significant problem. While these institutions’
perspectives often dominate, it is difficult to know to what extent

123. While this is undoubtedly an oversimplification, a simple model of a complex
process can help “clarify our thinking and enable us to extract implications from admittedly
oversimplified versions of reality.” See Ronald W. Perry, The Effects of Ethnicity on Evacuation
Decision-Making, 9 INT’L J. OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 47, 48 (1991).
124. Michael Greenberger, Preparing Vulnerable Populations for a Disaster: Inner-City
Emergency Preparedness - Who Should Take the Lead?, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 291,
298–99 (2007) (citing A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE
KATRINA, H.R. REP. NO. 109–377, AT 73 (2006), available at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/katrina/index.html) (“The Louisiana evacuation for the
general population, including contraflow, worked very well. Governor Kathleen Babineaux
Blanco and other state officials labeled the implementation of this evacuation as masterful and
as one of the most successful emergency evacuations in history.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11 and 14.
126. Dr. Keith Ablow, Why Don’t People Evacuate When Sandy or Another Major Storm
NEWS
(Oct.
29,
2012),
Looms?
Are
They
Nuts?
FOX
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/10/29/why-dont-people-evacuate-when-sandy-oranother-major-storm-looms-are-nuts/; Melissa Dahl, Storm Psychology: Why Do Some People
Stay Behind? NBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/stormpsychology-why-do-some-people-stay-behind-971995; Timothy Dwyer & Michael A. Fletcher,
POST
(Sept.
8,
2005),
Residents
Stay
Put,
Despite
Orders,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/07/AR2005090701309.html; Rick Jervis, Officials Fear
TODAY
(Oct.
28,
2012),
Many
Won’t
Evacuate,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/28/hurricane-sandy-wontevacuate/1662755/; New Orleans will Force Evacuations, CNN.COM (Sept. 7, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/06/katrina.impact/.
127. See Stephens, supra note 8; see also Dahl, supra note 126 (noting the typical
response website commenters had to non-evacuators: “What part of MANDATORY
EVACUATION do these people NOT UNDERSTAND!” and “You were told to evacuate!
Now you should be on your own and not expect others to put themselves in harms
[sic] way!”).
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their ideas are representative of non-evacuators generally. Judith N.
Shklar explained, “Neither the facts nor their meaning will be
experienced in the same way by the afflicted as by mere observers or
by those who might have averted or mitigated the suffering. These
people are too far apart to see things in the same way.” 128 The fact
that defining the willful non-evacuation problem is largely the
province of observers may account for the overwhelming perception
that non-evacuation is predominantly a meaningful choice.
Notwithstanding uncertainty concerning the size of the problem,
anecdotal evidence demonstrates that some people disobey
evacuation orders willfully, choosing to ride out the storm. With
respect to why Willful Stayers choose not to evacuate, it is sufficient
to say that, while many are motivated by a sense of invulnerability,
others often remain for compelling reasons. Take, for example, the
Dresch family from Staten Island. 129 When they evacuated for
Hurricane Irene, they found their house looted upon their return
days later. 130 When Hurricane Sandy approached, Mr. and Ms.
Dresch and their youngest daughter decided not to evacuate in order
to protect their home. 131 Waves overwhelmed their home, and water
quickly filled the second floor. 132 The roof caved in, and the house
was washed away. 133 Mr. Dresch and his daughter were found dead,
with only Ms. Dresch surviving the ordeal. 134
On the one hand, this tragedy demonstrates that non-evacuation
is sometimes the product of a meaningful choice. However, it also
demonstrates how complicated that choice can be, even for those
without circumstances conventionally perceived as vulnerable. The

128. Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, 23
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23, 71, n.15 (2012) (quoting JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF
INJUSTICE 1 (1990)).
129. See Kia Gregory, After Tragic Loss During Hurricane Sandy, a Woman Chooses not to
Return, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/
nyregion/after-tragic-loss-during-hurricane-sandy-a-woman-chooses-a-buyout.html.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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two categories I have outlined, Willful Stayers and Vulnerable
Stayers, often overlap. Illustratively, the Dresch family’s vulnerability
to looting induced their choice not to evacuate. By terming these
individuals Willful Stayers, I do not mean to say that they are
without vulnerability, only to say that their vulnerability does not
unequivocally prevent them from evacuating of their own accord.
The category I have termed Vulnerable Stayers deals with a
more profound vulnerability, the kind that makes evacuation
impractical or impossible. While government officials, the
media, and the public often focus on Willful Stayers, social
research has shown that such stories of purposefulness are
often not representative, especially in the case of vulnerable
citizens. In fact, vulnerable populations’ inability to comply
with evacuation orders is not a new phenomenon. As early as
1956, researchers detected different evacuation behavior
among minorities. 135 In the 1970s, researchers began to focus
more concertedly on “racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
differences in disaster response and recovery.” 136 Since that
time, extensive quantitative and statistical research has been
published outlining the impact social characteristics have on
disaster response. 137
Studies concerning disaster communication and response have
found that “minority and low income households are less likely to
receive . . . official disaster warnings,” which presumably include
evacuation orders.138 In the event such warnings are received, these
households are less likely than their higher income counterparts to
believe them.139 Among those who take the warnings seriously, they are
less likely to have the resources necessary to obey them.140 Hurricane
Katrina is an apt example. In New Orleans, thousands who did not

135. Verchick, supra note 128, at 41.
136. Id. at 42.
137. Id.
138. Sammy Zahran, et al., Social Vulnerability and the Natural and Built Environment:
A Model of Flood Casualties in Texas, 32 DISASTERS 537, 540 (2008).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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evacuate had no access to private transportation, no financial resources
to evacuate on their own, or no way to the leave the dangerous areas
safely without additional assistance.141 Thus, this group’s ability to
evacuate is inhibited by several factors including ignorance of orders,
distrust of the message-giver, and insufficient resources.
This group regards non-evacuation not as a choice but as the
only action possible in its resource-limited circumstances. 142 One
study surveyed, among others, those who survived the storm—nonevacuees, evacuees, and first responders. 143 Researchers then divided
their responses into one of three categories: “shared themes,”
“[t]hemes significantly more common among leavers than among
stayers,” and “[t]hemes significantly more common among stayers
than among leavers.” 144 Themes more common among stayers than
leavers included the following: “I try not to let it get me down. I just
let it make me stronger”; “We had a good community. All the people
here help one another”; “The hand of God took care of me and
that’s why whatever I do, wherever I go, I just trust in God”; and “I
was worried . . . for a lot of people.” 145 Upon analyzing these themes
in their broad context, the researchers concluded, “understanding
survivors’ actions requires realizing that what can be done is
contingent on the resources that people have available to them.” 146
Many non-evacuators commonly emphasized personal strength,
reliance on community, and faith in God because those were the
resources available to them. Although other respondents—evacuees
and first responders—found non-evacuees’ behavior transgressive, 147

141. Greenberger, supra note 124, at 299–300; see also Elizabeth Fussell, Leaving New
Orleans: Social Stratification, Networks, and Hurricane Evacuation, SOC. SCI. RES. COUNCIL
(June 11, 2006), http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Fussell/ (“New Orleanians’ plans for
evacuation were strongly shaped by their income-level, age, access to information, access to
private transportation, their physical mobility and health, their occupations and their social
networks outside of the city. These social characteristics translated into distinct evacuation
strategies for different sectors of the population.”).
142. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 885.
143. Id. at 879, 882.
144. Id. at 883 – 84.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 884 – 85.
147. Id. at 880.
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non-evacuees regarded their own behavior as a product of their
resource-limited circumstances. 148 Evacuation, for one reason or
another, was not or did not appear to be an option, so they did the
best they could to cope with what seemed like the only rational
alternative—staying.
B. Who Is Guilty? Arrest, Prosecution, and Condemnation

With the potential offenders in mind, I now turn to the question
of who among these classes of offenders would be subject to criminal
sanctions. The objective of this discussion is to determine whether
the statutes’ sanctioning power is appropriately and desirably applied.
By sanctions, I refer broadly to the three enforcement regimes
discussed earlier: arrest and relocation, prosecution, and societal
condemnation through criminal law’s expressive function.
1. Arrest and relocation.

Under the arrest and relocation enforcement objective, virtually
every offender identified above would be affected. While statutes
criminalizing non-evacuation give one basis for this authority, they
are not the only basis. As the First Circuit has explained, “Almost
every state in the United States has adopted statutes providing for
the exercise of police powers in the event of an emergency or disaster
(such as fire, flood, tornado, hurricane, etc.).” 149 Such statutes do
not typically allocate criminal liability, but express or imply the state’s
powers to protect the public. 150 The authority to seize and relocate
citizens does not require reasonable suspicion that a crime has been
committed; rather, the authority is implied from broader statutory

148. Id. at 885.
149. Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 258 (1st Cir. 2003).
The Court goes further and cites approvingly an inference of an Ohio statute stating an officer
“may, in a reasonable manner, remove to a safe area any persons who refuse to evacuate
voluntarily.” See id. (quoting 1987 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 99). Furthermore, the Court
states, “We have no doubts about the constitutionality of such authority.” Id. at 258 n.9.
150. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:724(C)(3) (2007) (granting power to “[c]ontrol
ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within the area, and
the occupancy of premises therein”).
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authorizations. 151 Seizure and relocation would exist even if the state
did not make non-compliance criminal. For example, Texas’s
recently enacted statute explicitly lays out this authority to seize and
relocate but does so without defining a criminal offense. 152
Although the criminal law is not the only enabler of the seize and
relocate enforcement option, it provides an unequivocal basis for the
option and, therefore, deserves some discussion. Since the law
establishes a legal basis for arresting citizens, the question becomes
whether the state or municipality should use this authority. In a
House of Representatives bipartisan committee meeting following
Hurricane Katrina, Governor Blanco argued that “evacuation at
‘gunpoint’ [is] unjustified . . . and impractical.” 153 Both of these
adjectives invite discussion.
a. Unjustified. The position that arrest and relocation is
unjustified is largely premised on Americans’ deep-rooted reverence
for property rights. One author observed how forcible eviction
threatens these rights:
[F]orcible eviction appears to be another symptom of the disease
manifest in society in the form of rapidly eroding property rights.
The government’s ability to oust citizens from their homes to build
shopping malls and business districts and, now, to remove citizens
from private residences when it believes it should, begs the
question of whether private property rights are merely illusory. 154

The importance of property rights is often heightened in the
midst of disaster scenarios. Concerns regarding looting arise. 155
Those who are forced from their homes may be restricted from
returning for a long period of time, an inconvenience that delays the

151. See, e.g., Konie v. Louisiana, CIV.A. 05-6310, 2010 WL 812980 (explaining the
allegations of a woman who was arrested for violating a mandatory evacuation order, even
though Louisiana had not statutorily criminalized the conduct).
152. See supra note 19.
153. See Fairchild, supra note 20, at 961.
154. Jonathan Jorissen, Katrina’s House: The Constitutionality of the Forced Removal of
Citizens from Their Homes in the Wake of Natural Disasters, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 587,
606 (2007).
155. Id. at 606 – 07.
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individual recovery process. 156 There are also more fundamental
property concerns, namely, whether the property will be able to
withstand the disaster at all.
Alternatively, governments assert that evacuation orders are
justified to protect citizens, to improve clean-up efforts, and to
maintain order. 157 In this context, governments play a paternalistic
role, acting to protect citizens from danger, including danger from
themselves. 158 Such paternalistic laws are rampant in today’s society
and include legislation involving seat belts, smoking, and illegal
drugs. 159 While laws dealing with seat belts, smoking, and the like
involve restricting privileges, mandatory evacuation involves
restricting constitutional rights. 160 For the state to justify revoking
such a fundamental right, its interest must be far more compelling
than the “potential for disease” or the “desire for orderly cleanup.” 161 Upon this basis, arrest and relocation are unjustified.
b. Impractical. Arrest and relocation are impractical, as well. The
number of law enforcement officers required to remove all nonevacuators from their homes would be overwhelming. Even if
adequate law enforcement could be mustered to accomplish the task,
there is a significant question about whether this would be a prudent
use of resources. States apparently recognize the impracticality of
such a maneuver since, in reality, arrests have typically been limited
to special circumstances and violations. 162 Even in those limited
circumstances, arresting one hubristic non-evacuator may come at
the expense of aiding another who desperately needs assistance.
There are too many Vulnerable Stayers for the state to conscionably
pursue the Willful Stayers.

156. Id. at 607.
157. Id. at 604.
158. Id. at 602.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 602 – 04.
161. Id. at 604.
162. Amy L. Fairchild et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Mandatory Hurricane
Evacuation, NAT’L CENTER FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 17 (Oct. 2006),
http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15773.
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While the arrest and relocation objective may serve a valid
purpose in a narrow set of circumstances, it is largely unjustified and
impractical. Furthermore, states can empower law enforcement to
seize and relocate citizens without codifying a crime through its
police power. Because of the negative effects that come with
criminalization, states desiring to use this authority should
implement it through other statutory means.
2. Prosecution

Whether a given offender would be subject to prosecution
depends on the mens rea threshold the jurisdiction requires. Because
I am discussing non-evacuators, the mens rea is the only element at
issue. 163 For illustrative purposes, I will examine the offenders under
two different mens rea regimes: willful and public welfare offense.
a. Willful. Under a willful regime, all offenders who had
knowledge of the mandatory evacuation order and its legal import
would be subject to criminal prosecution. On its face, the willful
statutes could implicate both Willful and Vulnerable Stayers;
however, it is less likely to reach Vulnerable Stayers in light of the
fact that such non-evacuees are less likely to have notice of the
orders. 164 Accordingly, at first glance, this seems an appropriate
course of action. It’s not hard to imagine a scenario where an
individual refuses to evacuate, requires rescue, jeopardizes the lives of
rescue workers, and is issued criminal sanctions for disobeying
evacuation orders. Society at large would likely be comfortable with
this result as it comports with our values of desert and
blameworthiness. The common sentiment, “What part of
MANDATORY EVACUATION do these people NOT
UNDERSTAND,” 165 would be vindicated.

163. Non-evacuators have already committed the actus reus by not evacuating.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 138–41.
165. See supra note 126.
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But these blanket assertions ignore harsh realities. Recall the
Dresch family, for example. 166 Should Ms. Dresch, as the only member
of her family to survive, be subject to criminal sanctions? Although no
reasonable citizen would condone this result, she would nevertheless
likely satisfy the elements of the crime. 167 But rather than receiving
criminal sanctions, Ms. Dresch attended a news conference at Staten
Island Borough Hall with New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
and other officials. 168 There, she was introduced as the first
homeowner to be bought out pursuant to New York City’s Hurricane
Sandy recovery program. 169 Viewing this transaction through a
criminal law lens, it becomes one where criminal behavior inspires
mayoral sympathy and government assistance. In reality, both the man
requiring rescue and Ms. Dresch made the same choice in the eyes of
the law, but for this law to operate in a way that comports with social
conscience, the legislature would need to write in an arbitrary
exclusion for those that arouse sympathy.
This anecdote reveals a great deal about the desirability of a
statute criminalizing willful non-evacuation. First, it shows that the
traditional framework may not be an appropriate vehicle for treating
the non-evacuation problem. The traditional framework cannot
function without blame. But when society learns the facts, when
individuals become something more than uninformed observers,
willful non-evacuation often loses its power to inspire feelings of
desert. This occurs not only when tragic results befall victims, but
also when the choice to not evacuate is complicated. Sympathy is not
the only thing mitigating society’s need to punish. The mitigation
also stems from the “universal and persistent” belief that the law

166. See supra text accompanying notes 129–34.
167. The particular law that the Dresch family would have been subjected to only
required a knowing violation. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(5) (McKinney 2014). The law became
effective on March 30, 2012, and Hurricane Sandy made landfall in October of that year.
While it is difficult to ascertain whether the family knew non-evacuation was illegal, it appears
they at least had sufficient knowledge of the order to satisfy the knowing standard they would
be held to.
168. Gregory, supra note 129.
169. Id.
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should only punish a blamable choice. 170 On the one hand, the
choice may fail to inspire blameworthiness because a reasonable
person in the same circumstance would have weighed the risks
similarly. On the other hand, the choice may not be perceived as a
choice, but an unavoidable course of action taken to preserve or
protect an important right or resource.
Secondly, this example reveals the illogic of blaming and
punishing victims. 171 Failing to evacuate often brings about terrible
consequences. Accordingly, these laws threaten to place even more
burden on those who have already suffered the toll of disaster. 172 By
assigning blame to disaster victims, these laws have the potential of
distracting authorities from what the victims really need—help.
Blaming the victim relieves other accountable players from taking
responsibility. 173 This practice of shifting blame is not new: “When
millions perished in Bengal’s 1943 famine, Winston Churchill
scandalously blamed Indians for ‘breeding like rabbits,’ instead of
admitting his government’s incompetence.” 174 Furthermore, as
discussed above, 175 when “federally maintained levees burst and
drowned the Crescent City, beset victims were forced to swallow a
torrent of blame from moralizing Congressmen and agency
officials.” 176 Assigning culpability to the evacuation choice, as the
traditional framework does, is perhaps worse than these sporadic,

170. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
171. See generally Fussell, supra note 141 (citing WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM
(1976)) (“One fundamental insight of social science is to understand the illogic of blaming
the victim.”).
172. To give the legislature the benefit of the doubt, it is possible that these laws were
enacted to deter non-evacuation behavior, rather than punish it. If such is the case, New York’s
most recent hurricane activity suggests that the laws fail to achieve this objective. See infra text
accompanying notes 184–86.
173. See SHKLAR, supra note 128, at 60 (“Next to guilt, the most truly unjust and
unwarranted response to accidents and disasters is scapegoating . . . .”).
174. Verchick, supra note 128, at 55 (quoting MADHUSREE MUKERJEE, CHURCHILL’S
SECRET WAR 205 (2010)).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 9–14.
176. Verchick, supra note 128, at 55 (citing FEMA Chief: Victims Bear Some
Responsibility, supra note
9; Arizona
Talk
Radio
Brings
You
Some
Kindly
Compassion, AZCENTRAL.COM (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic
/local/articles/0904polinsider04.html).
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insensitive remarks, for it represents a systematic process of
misapplied scapegoating that parades under the guise of legal
legitimacy. Prosecuting willful violators produces undesirable results
by assigning blame to those already burdened and excusing other
accountable parties from taking responsibility.
b. Public welfare offense. Under a public welfare offense regime,
all offenders, regardless of knowledge, intent, or resources, would be
subject to criminal prosecution. Thus, the law would even punish
Vulnerable Stayers who don’t receive notice of orders or otherwise
lack means to obey. The injustice of such a practice is astounding, so
much so that it seems particularly unlikely that society would
condone such prosecutions. In fact, as of this writing, I have not
uncovered a prosecution premised on the violation of a nonevacuation statute. 177
However, a statute that disproportionately incriminates
vulnerable populations is not made valid by its dormancy. If this
sleeping giant is awakened by making non-evacuation a public
welfare offense, the legislature has not only secured penalties for
Willful Stayers, but also, and perhaps especially, for its
underprivileged citizens. The offense is premised on the idea that
punishing innocence may occur: “the interest of the enforcement for
the public health and safety requires the risk that an occasional nonoffender may be punished in order to prevent the escape of a greater
number of culpable offenders.” 178
Rather than seeking to affix blame, public welfare offenses seek
to prevent a public harm the regulated activity causes. If the conduct
does not cause harm that the regulation is capable of avoiding or
mitigating, it is difficult to affix a purpose to that regulation or call it
good policy. To ascertain whether prosecution premised on nonevacuation would serve the ends of the public welfare offense, the
following discussion will seek to establish what type of harm nonevacuation creates and whether criminalization is an appropriate
method for mitigating or preventing that harm.

177. See supra text accompanying note 107.
178. Levenson, supra note 62 (citing People v. Travers, 124 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (1975))
(emphasis removed).
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Non-evacuation harm can be divided into two categories: harm
to others and harm to self. The harm principle is the most common
rationale for criminalizing conduct. John Stuart Mills explained that
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.” 179 The primary threat persistently identified in the
non-evacuation context, endangering first responders, is a classic
application of the harm principle. 180 The other threat non-evacuators
create is not to the public, but to themselves. 181 Paternalism describes
the body of law designed to prohibit such self-harm. 182 Soft
paternalism prohibits conduct in areas “where the individual has
assumed a risk without adequate information, without sufficient
maturity, or without adequate freedom from coercion.” 183 Hard
paternalism, however, goes further and prohibits conduct that is
both “informed and voluntary.” 184 Statutes criminalizing nonevacuation more accurately fall within the soft paternalism category.
The paternalistic statute operates on the assumption that individuals
are, on the whole, unable to acquire all relevant information,
rationally process that information, or both. The law assumes that
the public official, however, is capable of such a task and, therefore,
shifts the duty to him. Thus, if an offender disregards a gubernatorial
or municipal evacuation order, he is, in effect, demonstrating his
“[in]sufficient maturity” by disrespecting the legislature’s delegation
of that decision-making right. 185

179. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The
Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 434 (2000) (quoting JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin ed., 1974) (1859)).
180. Id.
181. Fairchild, et al., supra note 20, at 958–59; see also Fissell, supra note 18, at 143 (“It
is not hard to imagine that a homeowner might, upon hearing the warnings, be so adequately
prepared for a disaster that his decision to leave or stay has absolutely no impact upon anyone
but himself, or in the alternative, that one might accept the risk and not ask for rescue, thus
incurring no costs.”).
182. Pope, supra note 179, at 429. Importantly, “in reality most intervention is ‘impure’
paternalism, that is, it is for the good of the individual and also of others.” Id. at 454–55.
183. Id. at 429–30.
184. Id. at 430.
185. There is a substantial question about whether the paternalism philosophy has any
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Criminalizing non-evacuation is ultimately bad policy. There is
no indication that first responder harm is somehow more
extraordinary in the non-evacuation context than it is in other
scenarios where first responders are called upon. As in all first
responder operations, if the circumstances surrounding a rescue
request are so severe as to make the operation impractical or
impossible, it will not be attempted. Also, those who do receive
assistance are doing no more than asking first responders to perform
duties within their job description. The risks non-evacuators create
for first responders are typical of those risks first responders regularly
encounter. If legislatures criminalize one activity on the basis that it
requires first responders to perform their duties, why not criminalize
all activities that prompt emergency response? The answer that
policymakers seem to rely upon is that non-evacuators are more
culpable for putting first responders at risk. But, as this Comment
demonstrates, the difference between non-evacuators and other
victims of disaster is slight, if not nil. It is certainly insufficient to
justify criminalization.
Furthermore, if the harm is to justify the means, the means
ought to diminish the harm. Public welfare offense liability is an
ineffective and unjustified sanction unless its imposition fixes the
non-evacuation problem. The only way imposing strict criminal
liability conceivably addresses these harms is by deterring nonevacuation behavior in the first place. However, in the case of
Vulnerable Stayers, facilitation, rather than deterrence, is what is
needed, and in the case of Willful Stayers, the deterrent effect of the
law is questionable.
Compliance, or the lack of, with New York’s statute criminalizing
non-evacuation during Hurricane Sandy is illustrative. 186 One factor

place in lawmaking. In the non-evacuation context, this raises the question of whether the selfharm of non-evacuation is an appropriate basis for prohibiting the conduct. For more on this
topic, see Jorissen, supra note 154, at 616. For a general discussion on the validity of
paternalism, see David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519
(1988); Eric Tennen, Is the Constitution in Harm’s Way? Substantive Due Process and Criminal
Law, 8 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 3 (2004).
186. See, e.g., Nathaniel Herz, Don’t Blame Irene, THE N.Y. WORLD (Nov. 8, 2012),
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/11/08/dont-blame-irene/.
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indicating compliance was the number of citizens who took refuge in
shelters. 187 While 9,600 people took refuge in shelters in 2011 when
Hurricane Irene hit (before the law was effective), only 6,100 people
took refuge in shelters as Hurricane Sandy approached in 2012 (after
the law was effective). 188 If the possibility of criminal sanctions
effectively deterred people, presumably more people would have
sought refuge in shelters during Sandy.
Several studies have found that the criminal law is, on the whole,
an ineffective deterrent to criminal conduct. 189 Potential offenders
are often unaware of the law. 190 If they know the law, they make their
decision based on a cost-benefit analysis, and because potential
offenders perceive a low likelihood of detection, this analysis
commonly encourages violation. 191 Even if that analysis urges
compliance, criminals still commonly fail to comply because of
overriding social or situational influences. 192 Although preventing
non-evacuation through deterrence would guard the safety of first
responders and non-evacuators, imposing criminal liability cannot
achieve that objective when it fails to provide Vulnerable Stayers with
the choice and fails to deter Willful Stayers from making the choice.
c. Prosecutorial discretion and criminal defenses. Prosecutorial
discretion could ameliorate some of the problems identified above,
such as the prosecution of victims like Ms. Dresch or the prosecution
of Vulnerable Stayers. The initial decision to charge an individual
largely depends on the prosecutor’s discretion. 193 To justify

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal
Justice in the Information Age: A Punishment Theory Paradox, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 683
(2004); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Social Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) [hereinafter Robinson, Does Criminal
Law Deter?]; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).
190. Robinson, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 189, at 174.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995).
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prosecution, the prosecutor only needs to establish that there is
probable cause to believe the accused committed the offense. 194
Prosecutorial discretion is an important limitation on the law’s
potential to indict innocent or undeserving individuals: it is the
precise instrument that comes to mind when dealing with cases such
as Ms. Dresch. 195
While prosecutorial discretion may enable undeserving or
unremarkable defendants to escape prosecution, there are reasons
relying on this principle is undesirable. The depth of freedom in
plotting a prosecutorial course necessarily translates into a great deal of
power. 196 At least one author has suggested that it “gives prosecutors
more power than any other criminal justice officials, with practically
no corresponding accountability to the public they serve.” 197 Because
the decision to bring a charge, dismiss a charge already brought, or
forgo charging altogether is, for the most part, immune to judicial
review, 198 the discretion is especially prone to abuse.
Research showing prosecutors’ propensity to make racially based
decisions makes reliance on discretion particularly alarming.
“Evidence collected in scholarly articles indicates that the race of the
defendant and the victim sometimes affects the prosecutor’s decision
to file charges at all, her selection of the severity of charges to file,
and which charges to file.” 199 The fact that so many African American
defendants and victims lack power or are otherwise disadvantaged
increases the likelihood that prosecutors will “treat them less well

194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20 (1998) (“One easily thinks of the prototypical case of
a poor man who steals a loaf of bread to feed his starving family. Few would question the
propriety or fairness of a prosecutorial decision to dismiss criminal charges against this criminal
defendant. Such a decision could not be made in the absence of some level of discretion.”).
196. Meares, supra note 193, at 863.
197. Davis, supra note 195, at 18 (citations omitted).
198. Meares, supra note 193, at 862.
199. Id. at 888–89 (citing Randolph N. Stone, The Criminal Justice System: Unfair and
Ineffective, 2 HARV. J. AFR. AM. PUB. POL’Y 53, 63–64 (1993)); see also Davis, supra note 195,
at 16–17 (“[B]ecause prosecutors play such a dominant and commanding role in the criminal
justice system through the exercise of broad, unchecked discretion, their role in the
complexities of racial inequality in the criminal process is inextricable and profound.”).
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Because so many non-evacuators, especially
than whites.” 200
Vulnerable Stayers, are part of minority communities, prosecutorial
discretion seems to be an inadequate protection against abuse.
In the event prosecutors elect to prosecute individuals like Ms.
Dresch or Vulnerable Stayers, a criminal defense of justification or
excuse may also serve as protection. Justification concedes that the
defendant committed the act, but claims that the act was not
wrongful. 201 The relevant justification defense is that of necessity.
This arises when natural forces confront a person in an emergency
with a choice of two evils. 202 If violating the law will cause relatively
less harm than complying with it, the act is considered a necessity
and is, therefore, justified. 203 Excuse, on the other hand, concedes
that the defendant committed the act, but seeks “to avoid the
attribution of the act to the actor.” 204 An excuse can shield liability
when the actor’s ability to make unencumbered decisions or to
meaningfully control his behavior is impaired. 205
While it is not hard to imagine how these defenses could apply in
various non-evacuation circumstances, several factors impair their
ability to protect defendants. First, in the evacuation context,
application of these defenses would be novel. Necessity tends to deal
with “the destruction of another’s property to prevent further
destruction to more property or to save lives,” 206 while excuse tends
to involve defenses such as duress, insanity, and immaturity. 207
Second, the successful assertion of such defenses will often require
the intervention of counsel. Notably, “the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel does not apply to all misdemeanors,” and may therefore not

200. Davis, supra note 195, at 32.
201. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (2000).
202. Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and
What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 813 (2004).
203. Id.
204. FLETCHER, supra note 201.
205. See Milhizer, supra note 202, at 818.
206. Jorissen, supra note 154, at 611.
207. Milhizer, supra note 202, at 816 n.469.
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apply to non-evacuation charges. 208 While the Supreme Court has
ruled that “any imposed or suspended sentence of incarceration
triggers the right to counsel,” 209 crimes that merely impose fines,
such as non-evacuation in some instances, do not trigger the right. 210
Furthermore, “a Bureau of Justice report found that 28% of jail
inmates charged with misdemeanors stated, when interviewed, that
they had no counsel.” 211 Vulnerable Stayers are likely to be
vulnerable in many areas of their lives. They are more likely to not
have the luxury of hiring attorneys to defend their cases. Although
public defenders may be provided, 212 defendants may not understand
the significance of accepting such assistance and may waive that
right. While prosecutorial discretion and criminal defenses may aid in
protecting innocent or indigent offenders, these protections as they
apply to the non-evacuation problem are inadequate to fully address
the potential inequities.
3. Symbolic impact

Even if these laws are not enforced through traditional means,
such as arrest and relocation and prosecution, they have an
expressive impact upon those within and without its jurisdiction. At
the outset, it is important to note that “[p]revailing norms, like
preferences and beliefs, are not a presocial given but a product of a
complex set of social forces,” and law is only one of those forces. 213
Thus, the issues to be discussed are not solely the product of the
laws at issue, but laws certainly contribute. To fully assess the

208. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 310 (2011).
209. Id. at 311 & n.144 (citing Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002)).
210. See id. at 311 & n.146 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979)).
211. Id. at 312. The survey does not indicate the demographics of those surveyed, so it is
not entirely clear whether the survey results reflect an inequity for one group over another.
However, even assuming that the results reflect an equal impact along racial and socioeconomic lines, the results still suggest that many persons would be devoid of the legal counsel
essential to successfully mounting a legal defense.
212. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
213. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2026 (1996).
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expressive impact, I will consider the norms that criminalization of
non-evacuation communicates and how social enforcement of those
norms impacts non-evacuators.
The basic message criminalizing non-evacuation sends is that
people should evacuate. This is, overall, an uncontroversial directive.
However, its simplicity makes it dangerous. If the norm is simply
that one must evacuate when ordered to do so, this fails to account
for the litany of legitimate reasons people disobey. One would hope
that the public could appreciate the complicated plight of those
facing an evacuation decision, but research suggests that the public
fails to discriminate. 214 One study already mentioned here 215 showed
that two classes of post-Katrina observers—relief workers and lay
observers—condemned non-evacuators by “using one particular set
of assumptions about the culturally ‘right’ way to act.” 216 As
discussed previously, the non-evacuators viewed their decision
differently, and for good reason, citing a number of option-limiting
factors. 217 This study supports the conclusion that, generally, the
public fails to account for the nuanced circumstances that prevent
compliance with evacuation orders.
The indiscriminate condemnation is troubling for several reasons.
First, unlike traditional enforcement, the public is not obligated to
give due process before issuing judgment and condemnation. 218 This
means there is no obligatory fact-finding, investigation, or benefit of
doubt. “[S]urely an offender cannot be said to deserve the vague
punishment given by ill-informed societal condemnation any more
than an innocent person deserves the culpability judgment of an illinformed factfinder.” 219

214. See generally Stephens et al., supra note 8.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 884.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 145–48.
218. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1819
(2001) (citing Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991)).
219. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182,
209 (2009).

544

CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

503

11/23/2015 3:53 PM

Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior

Second, while expressive enforcement may be constructive for
Willful Stayers, its indiscriminate application against Vulnerable
Stayers reinforces prejudicial attitudes. For Willful Stayers, the factors
emboldening them to stay are not as compelling, and social
condemnation following a disaster may convince them to evacuate
the next time a disaster strikes. However, in the case of Vulnerable
Stayers, expressive enforcement cannot be productive because
Vulnerable Stayers need help, not coercion or reprobation. Rather
than encouraging evacuation, condemnation will simply bolster and
further solidify the prejudices already directed at these citizens.
When society expresses its derogation for non-evacuators, those
feelings of derogation will likely spill over from the act to the actor,
especially if the observer already holds prejudices associated with the
actor’s characteristics.
To understand how this process works and why it matters, we
need to ascertain the qualities associated with non-evacuators
generally, the actual qualities of Vulnerable Stayers, and the
stereotypes already associated with Vulnerable Stayers. The public
generally views non-evacuation as a passive, irresponsible, careless,
and stubborn act. 220 Lay observers, relief workers, 221 and government
officials 222 embrace this sentiment. With respect to the actual
qualities of Vulnerable Stayers, they are presumably vulnerable
because they are poor, uneducated, or otherwise underprivileged. As
history has shown, those falling into this category are too often racial
minorities. In Hurricane Katrina, for example,
[i]t was a largely African American and often poor populace that
had lived in the areas most vulnerable to the collapse of the levees,
that proved unable to secure transportation to evacuate the city,
and that was now scrambling in frightening conditions to secure
scarce aid for their families, their friends, and themselves. 223

220.
221.
222.
223.

See Stephens et al., supra note 8, at 880.
Id. at 884.
See supra text accompanying notes 9–14.
PASTOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.

545

CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

11/23/2015 3:53 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2015

While it is possible that misdirected social condemnation may
create new stigmas about new groups of people, it is more likely that
it will reinforce those stigmas already in place. In light of this
country’s history of racism, it is not hard to imagine where those
stigmas exist. Research has shown that whites “view AfricanAmericans as a violent black underclass, associating traits like
aggressiveness, violence, and hostility with their stereotypical
opinions.” 224 In fact, “for many whites, crime policy attitudes are
fueled by their racial beliefs.” 225 “Research has also demonstrated
that even whites who consider themselves to be nonbiased and
liberal nonetheless harbor unconscious racist attitudes and behave in
racist fashion toward blacks.” 226
Combining these findings, when the negative perceptions of
the act of non-evacuation gradually become integrated into the
actor, the public will likely view both the act and the actor
negatively. But when the actor is already the target of prejudice, the
social condemner feels validated not only in his condemnation of
the act, but also in his preexisting prejudices. By making nonevacuation a crime, legislatures enable the public to reinforce
established stereotypes.
Even if non-evacuation laws are not enforced through traditional
means, they will have a negative impact on non-evacuators. This is
particularly true for Vulnerable Stayers who are condemned and
further marginalized for an innocent act.
V. CONCLUSION

In late 2005, a Select Bipartisan Committee formed by the U.S.
House of Representatives investigated the failures of the

224. Sherrie Armstrong Tomlinson, No New Orleanians Left Behind: An Examination of
the Disparate Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Minorities, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1153, 1169–70
(2006) (quoting John Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role
of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 393 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive
in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 426 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

546

CURTIS.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

503

11/23/2015 3:53 PM

Criminalizing Non-Evacuation Behavior

governmental response to Katrina. 227 Throughout these hearings,
two views emerged concerning the purpose of mandatory evacuation
orders: (1) evacuation orders trigger the obligation to provide for
people, and (2) evacuation “orders entail deciding for people.” 228
Despite recognizing these dual obligations during the hearing,
“[t]he view that the government bore an obligation not only to
provide for the public but also to compel them to evacuate did not
appear in the committee’s final report.” 229 If policymakers are going
to effect a meaningful change in evacuation behavior, they must
begin by adopting policies that account for both of these obligations.
Criminalization ultimately goes too far in advancing the
deciding-for obligation, and does so at the expense of the providingfor responsibility. While encouraging evacuation is a worthy goal,
criminalization frames non-evacuation solely as a malfunction of
human agency, and thus fails to address some of the most
fundamental obstacles. A substantial group of citizens fail to evacuate
not because they lack adequate incentive, but because they lack
adequate resources. These citizens need help, not punishment.
Criminalization, rather than providing aid, affixes blame to victims,
diminishes the role of governmental shortcomings, and threatens to
further burden those already reduced to destitution by the disaster.
While North Carolina’s public welfare offense is designed to avert
harm rather than affix blame, it does so at the risk of penalizing
vulnerable, and ultimately innocent, citizens. Furthermore, nonevacuation primarily creates self-harm, and criminalization fails to
mitigate that harm by inadequately deterring Willful Stayers and
altogether neglecting Vulnerable Stayers. Even if government
officials do not enforce the law in a traditional sense, the law’s
expressive impact will negatively contribute to public attitudes of
non-evacuators, especially Vulnerable Stayers.

227. Fairchild et al., supra note 20, at 960.
228. Id. at 960
229. Id. at 961.
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At its best, criminalizing non-evacuation encourages the status
quo, and at its worst, it has potential to exacerbate the nonevacuation problem.
Brandon Curtis
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